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Physis and Design.
Interaction between nature
and culture
Observations on nature
Humanity has always observed nature to extract imag-
es, metaphors and analogies that could be transfered
to culture, that is to say, artistic expression and philo-
sophical research. More recently, with the beginning of
physical sciences, it has borrowed other metaphors
and analogies that it has applied to the field of anthro-
po-social disciplines. Even more recently, with the def-
inite imposition of industrial society, it has looked
there for solutions from which to orient its own choic-
es when designing, by transposing natural forms and
apparatus to the world of artificiality.
All this has long been known and shared. Let us
now try to consider the same sentence, interchanging
the terms «nature» and «culture». The result is a new
sentence whose contents are also widely shared: hu-
manity has always looked to nature, projecting imag-
es, metaphors, and analogies that emerged from artis-
tic expression and philosophical research. More
recently, it has borrowed from the mechanical world
that it was creating other metaphors and analogies that
it applied to the field of natural and biological scienc-
es. Even more recently, with the definite imposition of
techno-science, it has used specific technologic solu-
tions as a model to read the function of biologic appa-
ratus.
This exercise, which could seem a play on words,
really evidences quite well the point to which the idea
of nature and culture are linked together in a biunivo-
cal relationship in which one does not exist without
the other: the nature of which we are speaking is really
a human «invention», that is, a cultural construction.
And in its turn this cultural construction cannot do
without the «naturalness» of the humanity which pro-
duces it and the environment where it is found.
The «observations on nature» which follow must
not, therefore, be understood as a faithful reading
(which it means to be) of a presumably objective reali-
ty. On the contrary, they must be considered as obser-
vations on that which we are today capable of saying
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about and seeing in nature. «Observations on nature»,
in the spirit proposed here —which is that of the cog-
nitive theories of «radical constructivism» (WATZLAW-
ICK, 1981)— means, therefore: «observations on the
current idea of nature».
Learning from nature
The contribution which follows develops the theme
«What lessons can the designer today obtain from na-
ture?» It is necessary to point out that this question can
be answered from many points of view. At one extreme
there is the punctual observation that establishes a
comparison between organisms and concrete devices.
On the other extreme there is the global observation
which establishes the comparison between natural ec-
osystems (and their development) and artificial sys-
tems (and their innovations). My contribution will re-
fer mainly to observations relevant to this second point
of view. It is from here, actually, that I think the de-
signer can obtain deep, and, perhaps, strategic knowl-
edge.
In fact, the theme of the observation of nature to-
day needs looking at, and we will do so in this contri-
bution, in the light of two fundamental issues which
give it a special current importance:
1. The evolution of scientific thinking and the
transformation of the idea of nature which that brings
about.
2. The environmental crisis and the current transi-
tion toward an sustainable society.
The convergence of these phenomena create a to-
tally new context for design: the transition toward an
sustainable society, which calls for a great social crea-
tivity and poses new issues. The evolution of scientific
thinking, which carries with it a wider cultural trans-
formation, calls for a discussion of many of its very
bases. The emergence of a new idea of nature which
offers a different vision of reality, offers stimuli for re-
flection and occasions to develop a new culture, more
adequate for current necessities.
Physis
A change of paradigm
The idea of nature which scientific thinking, from
Newton on, had produced and which modern society,
in all its dominant components had adopted, was that
of a nature-machine, reductible to its constituent parts,
transparent in its functioning, predictable in its behav-
iour (and, definitely, potentially, completely, mastera-
ble by humanity). This mechanicist, reductivist and
determinist view of nature, to which we can refer with
the expression «mechanical paradigm», had been ex-
tending to all sciences till it became one of the basic
structures of modern western culture.
Today this idea of the nature-machine, and, more
generally, this mechanical paradigm, is in crisis. A cri-
sis which began some time ago in the scientific field
and which has been extending from here to all the
fields where this kind of thinking had heretofore been
imposed.
The origin of this crisis is to be sought, therefore,
in a varied group of scientific disciplines whose com-
mon trait is that of a strict description of the irreversi-
ble processes that take place in the transformation of
complex systems: general systems theory, cybernetics,
information and communication theory, theory of cha-
os, thermodynamics of non-balance... (CERUTI, LASZLO,
1988).
The return of physis
Contemporary sciences have evidenced that what we
call nature is a group of phenomena characterized
by the emergence of the unpredictable, the singular,
the chance, and, from this, autoorganization, au-
toregulation, creative evolution, an evolution which
is creator of new forms of order. It has been from
these new viewpoints that the old aristotelian idea
of physis has reappeared, the idea of «something»
that, as Cornelius Castoriadis writes, has in itself the
principle and the origin of the creation of forms: «In
this interpretation [...], let us say, therefore, it is
physis, it is nature, that which moves itself» (CASTO-
RIADIS, 1988 : 43).
To speak of physis means, therefore, to emphasize
the fact that contemporary science has reached an idea
very far from that of the great and perfect machine,
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perfectly ordered, that Newton had conceived. With
this new idea, as Edgar Morin writes,
the universe is no longer conceived according to the old
Sovereign Principle of Order; it must be conceived in
and through the links, the laws, the casual develop-
ments, that determine the interactions between the ele-
ments that form it, that is to say [...], in the dialogic
game between Order/Disorder/Organization (MoaiN,
1988 : 77).
And it is exactly in this continuous dialogue be-
tween order, disorder and organization, that we find
physis: nature, that shows itself to be unitary, integrat-
ed and irreductible in its parts. A nature in which
chance and necessity combine in the most unforeseea-
ble ways. A vital nature, in which we are immersed, of
which we ourselves are made, and which we ourselves
have produced.
Nature as a muddle of systems
Physis has a systematic nature: wherever we look, we
see relationships, connections, retroactions, which in-
terlace in time and space, and produce hierarchies, ge-
nealogies and ecologies.
Nature is nothing more than this extraordinary sol-
idarity of accumulated systems that build upon one an-
other, through one another, with one another, against
one another [...] Nature is a polysystematic whole
(MORIN, 1977).
The observation of nature implies, therefore, entering
this polysystem, individuating its entities (the systems),
and the relationships between them (subsystems, su-
persystems, ecosystems). And it is from this operation
that nature takes form for us and becomes our idea of
nature. In this last expression, the word «our» is un-
derlined: when we speak of nature in terms of systems,
hierarchies of systems and ecology of systems, we must
remember that
the limits between these terms are not clear, and these
terms are interchangeable in view of the focus, the
methodologic cut, the angle of vision, which the ob-
server adopts to consider the systematic reality (MORIN,
1977).
In other words, the division in systems and their
hierarchy are not intrinsic to nature, but rather depend
on our viewpoint and the model we create of them for
each determined end: we find systems and hierarchies
as much in nature as in the intentions of the observer.
Therefore, to affirm the systematic nature of nature
has some fundamental consequences: the indivisibility
of observer-observee, the role of the observer in the def-
inition of the observed system, and, therefore the irre-
ductible subjectivity of the way of «cutting» the com-
plexity of nature (and, in more general terms, the
complexity of reality) to define the limits of systems.
Nature as genealogy and as ecology
The observation of nature, and especially of the bio-
sphere, has led to the enlightenment of a variety of sys-
tematic properties related to the genealogy and the
ecology of the organisms that make it up: the evolu-
tionary models have contributed the dynamics of rela-
tionships in time, and the ecològic models those of re-
lationships in space (the ecosystem). More recently,
above all from the neo-darwinian theories proposed by
Stephen Gould and Elizabeth Urba, there have
emerged more clearly the relationships between the ge-
nealogy and the ecology of the living being, and the
relationships of circular causality established between
them (GOULD, 1982, 1985).
In the paragraphs which follow, I will indicate
some of these systemic properties, and the lessons to
designers will become evident. For expositive necessi-
ty, «genealogies» and «ecologies» will be treated sepa-
rately, although looking to make evident the relation-
ships between both of them and the convergence of the
indications applicable to design that derive from them.
Genealogies
Nature as a construction in time
By definition, physis is something that has in itself the
principle and the origin of change and of the creation
of forms. This change comes about in the ways de-
scribed by the evolutionary theories, ways which have,
in time, been recognized as operating in many fields of
investigation. Ervin Laszlo writes:
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If we go from the ambit of physics to that of biolo-
gy, from that of biology to social sciences and cultural
evolution, the basic descriptions of the processes of ev-
olution remain unaltered. General laws of evolution
exist, and these laws touch upon invariable structures
that are manifest in diverse transformations [...], one
understands that behind the great variety of empirical
phenomena there exists a background invariability, an
order that regulates the deployment of the diverse or-
ders of the Universe (LASZLO, 1988 : 228-229).
It is not my intention to present, in this contribu-
tion, a diagram of the recent evolution of evolutionary
theory (also because the theme and its implications for
the culture of design is taken on in the same issue of
this magazine in the intervention by Silvia Pizzocaro).
I only retake two arguments that seem to me to be po-
tentially most stimulating: the concept of «fi t» or
«adapted» (and the sub-optimality of natural systems
as a result of casual historical developments), and the
concept of «error» (and production and conservation
as a resource to which we can turn in case of a rapid
and unpredictable change of the environment).
What we adapt is not the optimal
The culture which, till today, has made us look at na-
ture as a «resource store-house» (and, on the other
hand, as a waste recipient) has led us to see in it a «cat-
alogue of optimal solutions».
A grossly functional viewpoint in the setting out of
human problems has actually been found in a particu-
lar (and not dominant even today) concept of darwin-
ism and natural selection, a concept that made us see
living organisms as the optimal solutions to the prob-
lems raised by a determined environment, and which
proposed, therefore, indications about the best route
for the design of artifacts intended to accomplish the
same objectives.
Today, however, interpretations of darwinism are
very different. S. Gould writes:
We do not live in a perfect world where natural se-
lection unpityingly sieves all organic structures with a
view towards optimum utility. Organisms inherit a cor-
poral form and an embrionic development which im-
pose constrictions on its future transformation and ad-
aptation. (GouLD, 1993 : 156).
According to this way of thinking, therefore, every or-
ganism that is successful (that is to say, that is «fit» or
adapted to the environment) is presented
as the casual result of a long sequence of unpredictable
antecedents, more than as the necessary observation of
the laws of nature [...]. Minor disturbances at the be-
ginning of the game may orientate the process in a new
direction, with a series of consequences that produce a
result very different from any other possibility (GouLD,
1993 : 68).
The result is that
there is no survival of the fittest, there is survival of the
fit. The necessary conditions can be satisfied in many
different ways, and we are not in the presence of the
optimization of a determined criterium in detriment of
survival itself (MATURANA, VARELA, 1985 : 75).
Sub-optimality: leaving room for improvisation
The genetic inheritance that leads to «fit» but not «op-
timal» organisms imposes ties, but also provides op-
portunities:
What «game» could develop if every structure were
constructed with a restricted objective in view, which
could not be used for anything else? In what way could
human beings learn to write if our brain had evolved
for hunting [...] and could not transcend the adaptive
confines of its original purpose? (GouLD, 1993 : 156).
I believe that from the observation of this phenom-
enon we can take indications useful for the designer.
At the level of concrete products, the indication is
very clear, almost banal. For example, we all know
that very specialized products are extremely rigid in
their possibility of use (that is, not very capable of
adapting): «ergonomic scissors» of optimum design
for the right hand of an average adult are not easily
used by a child, by an unaverage adult, and much less
by an amputee. Or: the sub-optimal nature of old
buildings has allowed their long-term adaptation in
the most diverse manner (an almost impossible feat in
the modern buildings of our time, optimized by the
most sophisticated calculations).
A similar rigidity, but even more dramatic in some
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aspects, can be found if we move from the concrete
product level, which we have just examined, to a wid-
er level where observation is of more complex systems
(and their evolutionary vicissitudes). At this level, the
theme of the sub-optimality of the system, that is to
say, of its excessive specialization, becomes truly stra-
tegic.
The study of natural evolution is very enlightening
on this theme: each time that a species has taken the
road to superspecialization, it has rapidly arrived at
extinction (due to the successive incapacity of adapt-
ing to mutating environmental conditions).
The lesson we can learn is that, by analogy, a suffi-
ciently low level of specialization must also be main-
tained in the evolution of economic, technologic and
social systems, a sub-optimalization that «is not the
expression of a definitive contingent limit in regard to
an ideal of optimization. It is, on the contrary, a pro-
found advance in the knowledge of Nature and Histo-
ry» (BocCHi, 1985 : 423).
Error-friendliness: the admissibility of error
The observation of nature, and especially of genetics,
tells us that:
1. There exist in the genetic pool a multiplicity of
small submerged mutations.
2. For the most part, these mutations, even though
they are recessive, and therefore unadapted, are pre-
served for a long time.
3. In environments subject to rapid change, the
bearers of these «errors» present a great capacity for
transformation, they adapt more easily, and therefore
enjoy selective advantages.
To characterize the capacity for transformation of
these organisms, Cristine von Weizaker has introduced
a German term, Fehlerfreundlichkeit, which has been
translated by the English expression error-friendliness,
which grosso modo means «a good attitude towards
errors». Ernst and Cristine von Weizaker write:
The idea of error-friendliness takes in the ideas of
production of errors, tolerance of errors, and the
«friendly» cooperation between these two aspects for
the exploration of new opportunities. It is in this coop-
eration where the use of errors is installed; this is an
absolutely general characteristic of all living organisms,
independent of what hierarchical level we wish to ex-
amine. [...] This is a mechanism thanks to which sys-
tems can face the future, which is open and unknown
(VON WEIZAKER, 1988 :131-132).
The main lesson to be learned from this, in refer-
ence to the design of complex systems, is the accept-
ance of the idea that all human and material actions
imply that errors will manifest themselves, and that we
must act in consequence. This means conceiving solu-
tions in which no error can result truly catastrophic.
But it also means seeing in «errors», understood in this
case as the sub-optimalities of which we have already
spoken, as a constituent trait of the quality of the sys-
tem, that is to say, of its flexibility and its capacity for
renewal.
In this spirit, megatechnologies, that is, great uni-
tary technical systems, are intrinsically far from the
philosophy of error-friendliness. Actually, due to the
fact that an eventual error in its functioning could have
effects (environmental, economic, social) of dimen-
sions coherent with their scale, their acceptability is
possible only in the «zero errors hypothesis». That is
to say, in the interior of a culture which considers pos-
sible the putting into practice of technology (and con-
ditioning the environmental context in which this is
installed), in such a way that the probability of the ver-
ification of unforeseen elements remains very low: so
low that it can be socially reputed as practically nil.
And vice-versa: technologic systems based on mod-
ular solutions, decentralized and diversified by pro-
duction and functional logic, are intrinsically more er-
ror-friendly. Actually, each of the diverse solutions
adopted can certainly become depleted or become «in-
adequate» (because of the change of context in which
it operates). However, because of the multiplicity and
the variety of the solutions that are present, that is to
say, because of the error-friendly nature of the system,
that does not lead to its complexive collapse. On the
contrary, there will be good possibilities that the sys-
tem will «autoorganize», making new solutions
emerge, based on a different combination of capacities
already present, but little valued till that moment.
The way that, in nature, a certain amount of error
is tolerated and protected as a base for possible solu-
tions for the future, is certainly not reproductible by
humanity. However that may be, we have seen that
their study offers some useful indications about how
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to put into practice technical systems with greater tol-
erance for errors and greater capacity for adapting.
These indications, which lead to interactive but dis-
perse solutions, based on diverse logic, definitely im-
ply a general increase of the complexity of the system.
We will return further on to this theme. It is useful,
however, to remember now that the term «complexi-
ty», as it is used here, has a meaning different from
«complication». It is just this distinction that evidenc-
es the fact that a multiplicity of disperse technologies,
based on diferentiated logic, gives us a complex sys-
tem; while a unitary and monological megatechnolo-
gy, in spite of its enormous complication, is placed in
the midst of an intrinsically simple system (STENGERS,
1985).
In the spirit of error-friendliness, the complexity of
the system becomes, therefore, an indication of its
quality in terms of its capacity for adaptating to errors
and reorganizing itself in relation to the unforeseen. It
definitely becomes an index of its «life expectancy» in
a future which, as we now know, is more uncertain and
unpredictable than ever.
Now that we have underlined this master line
which derives from the observation of nature, we must
also say that the acceptance of its operative implica-
tions absolutely cannot be taken for granted. This is
not because of technical problems, which do not
present outstanding difficulties (on the contrary, infor-
matics and telematics today make feasible possibilities
unthinkable till a few days ago). The difficulties that
error-friendly strategies find are substantially political-
cultural ones, and they arrive under the guise of tech-
nocratic convictions which are still dominant (and,
obviously, of the interests of the technocracies which
till now have practiced them). These convictions can
be reduced to the attraction for megatechnologies, that
is, the myths about functionality and the advantages
of great scale, to the blindness about the viability of
«zero risk» technical solutions, to the conviction of the
possibility of complete control over weather and the
developments that this could bring. Quite definitely:
error-friendly strategies come up against all the con-
ceptual and operative baggage of the mechanicist be-
lief, and they will only be able to liberate all their po-
tential in the framework of a general overcoming of
this baggage. That is to say, that change of paradigm
to which we have reffered so often.
Time as a construct
The vision of time is a central theme in the change in
course of the paradigm. Physis differs from the previ-
ous «Nature-machine» fundamentally by the diversity
of time which characterizes it (PRIGOGINE, 1981a): ma-
chine time is reversible time, physis time is, on the con-
trary, irreversible. It is under the cover of this irrevers-
ibility that the constructive character of reality takes
place: «Today, the science of physis and of the liv-
ing being converge in the fact of putting into relief the
constructive character of time and history» (BoccHi,
1985:419).
The new concept of time has many important im-
plications for the culture of design, of which I would
like to rememeber two: the step from «the project as
program» to the «project as strategy», and the step
from «irreversible project» to the «almost irreversible
project».
The first implication, which carries with it the idea
of «project as strategy», has as its starting-point the
confirmation of the failure of many, if not all, the great
technological projects proposed till now: from nuclear
energy programs to the great territorial and economic
plans. A failure that has as its basis the intention of
compromising resources and predefining developments
for a long period of time, and, consequently, in the hy-
pothesis of a full controlability of history. The back-
ground has been precisely this hypothesis, which has
demonstrated its own inconsistency. Its realization
would actually have required a controllable human
society, lacking all those possibilities for misunder-
standing, inattention, and errors, which, on the con-
trary, characterize it (we return, therefore, to the issue
of the error-friendliness of choices).
And not only this: it is experience itself which
shows us how the intent to pursue at any price the suc-
cess of these great programmes does not lead us to re-
ally make them reality, but rather to try to carry out «a
transformation of society in the direction of a perfect
rationality and a perfect transparency, and, conse-
quently, to draw a totalitarian horizon». Quite defi-
nitely, a perspective whose goal is the creation of
«many more problems than concomitant technical and
economic progress could contribute to resolve» (Boc-
CHI, CERUTI, 1990 : 53).
To escape from this perspective, we must recog-
nize the relationship between the diverse times in
play (individual, social, economic, technologic, ad-
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ministrative...), and the time of the project or the
design.
The direction towards which we must go, taking
the constructive nature of natural historical time as our
starting-point, is that of favouring the formation of
autocorrecting mechanisms between the project and
the coming to term of the project. The result ought to
be a project that is far from the idea of a program (un-
derstood as a predefinition of the necessary steps for
the consecution of an objective), and that is closer to a
strategy (understood as a sequence of attempts, suffi-
ciently flexible and reorientable according to what is
learned along the way). If we carry it out like this, the
time of the project can assume that «constructive»
character we have learned to recognize in nature, and
the project itself, like natural evolution, assumes the
capacity to live with errors and contingencies.
History, nature, the project, are not: they come to
be, in an interrupted process of reorganization pro-
duced by human conversation, and in which no sub-
ject, individual or collective, powerful or weak, can
take to itself the power of control, nor even of under-
standing, of the whole of the process (BoccHi, CERUTI,
1990:55).
Irreversibility or near-irreversibility
Physis time is an irreversible time. That means that the
machinery of nature can never go backwards.
As has often been said, on the other hand, this ma-
chinery of nature is of an astonishing complexity, and
the irreversibility of its time, which is materialized in
the evolution of highly flexible systems (that is to say,
endowed, as we have seen, with a great openness to
new possibilities), can also be transformed into a kind
of «quasi-reversibility». By this expression, we are to
understand the evolutionary property by which, ap-
parently, history can go back on its paces: a fish can
evolve into a land animal, and this land animal can
also re-evolve into an aquatic animal. This possibility
of turning back, however, is a quasi-reversibility: the
return to the water does not reconduct our animal to
the initial fish, but rather represents a further evolu-
tion towards a new animal whose characteristics are a
reorganization of the characteristics acquired in its
preceeding terrestrial precedents (JACOB, 1981). In oth-
er words, natural history can never turn back, but can
always find paths that can somehow resolve the same
problems that had been presented and resolved (in an-
other way) in the past.
Now we have come so far, we could ask ourselves
what similarities there can be in terms of reversibility/
irreversibility between natural evolution and the evo-
lution of artificial systems.
We have already said that natural evolution is an
irreversible phenomenon. We can add that it is so at all
levels, beginning with the most elementary develop-
ments, casual genetic mutations which are the «base
materials» of all evolution. And exactly there is where
we can immediately guess at a difference with the phe-
nomena of human innovations: the latter actually have
as their basis a conscious choice, a project thought out
with a concrete end. These intentional acts, on which
social and technological evolution is founded, could
seem, therefore, to be reversible: no matter where we
have arrived at, it is always possible to consciously
choose to go back. In reality the matter is not so sim-
ple, and, as can be seen if we examine these phenome-
na, reversibility does not exist even in these cases.
Actually, as much for the whole of society as for the
individual, when we choose to go back something has
already happened: we have covered part of the path
and undergone a process of learning. Quite definitely,
the one who makes the choice to go back is not the
same one who makes the choice to set out. Therefore it
is impossible to go back to the exact point of depar-
ture. And, consequently, the process is irreversible.
Quasi-reversibility and opening of the future
The theme of the reversibility/irreversibility of human
choices, and specially of the programmes and projects
with which we intervene in reality, is today particular-
ly current. On one hand we actually realize, much
more today than in the past, that the choices which at
this moment seem to be the best could be judged nega-
tively in the future.
On the other hand, in these years there has emerged
a new sensibility toward the generations which will
follow us, and to their right to a «livable world» (it is
the debate about the sustainibility of development)
and to an «open future» (which offers an alternative
range, equal or superior to that which we face today).
Thus, from the whole of this new sensibility there
derives an interest for solutions based on choices with
124
Ezio Manzmi
the greatest possible degree of reversibility, that will
not definitively fix the framework in which future gen-
erations will have to live.
The issues set forth are, therefore, the following:
now that we have arrived at this point of technical and
social development, how many alternative paths still
remain to explore? Is there a way to go back on some
of the choices already made? How do we act today to
widen the advantages of tomorrow's possibilities?
Let us continue in order. We have already said that
even in theory, it is impossible to go back (this makes
all those nostalgic positions of a «return to the past»
inconsistent). But, in practice, the limitation of alter-
natives is not only this: choices that slowly take place
can have a diversely conditioning nature on the short-
term, long-term, and very long-term future (the best-
known example of this is the choice of adopting nucle-
ar energy which forces coming generations to
undertake delicate systems of management and control
of very dangerous radio-active waste. This, even if,
hypothetically, their choice is to give up the use of nu-
clear energy).
The respect for the rights of future generations,
therefore, ought to lead us to act on projects in a man-
ner that leaves the greatest possible number of choices
open. In this wide range of possibilities there could
also be that of «quasi-reversibility»: a recovery of val-
ues and positions of the past, a return to choices made,
and a retaking of the path from another starting-point.
Therefore, if we adopt the indication of Heinz von
Foerster, the ethic imperative for the designer is «to act
in such a way that the number of choices is increased»;
the observation of nature leads us to transform this
ethical indication into a design attitude that E. Jantash
synthesized in the following way:
Designing in an evolutionary spirit does not lead to a
reduction of uncertainty and complexity, but rather to
its increase. Uncertainty increases because we decide to
widen the range of choices. Imagination comes into
play. Instead of doing the obvious, we wish to seek for
and take into account even that which is not obvious
(JANTASH, 1980:267).
Ecologies
Nature as an ecosystem
Ecology is a recent concept: in order to give birth to
and impose its unitary, integrated, and trans-discipli-
nary point of view, it has had to fight against the pre-
ponderant mechanicist culture that tended to view na-
ture by parts and by specialties. Introduced as a science
by Haeckel in 1866, it was only in the middle of this
century that it saw the formulation and acceptance of
key concepts of the ecosystem and the biosphere:
thanks to these concepts, nature has reappeared as
physis, that is, as a unitary, complex and vital entity.
In general terms, a natural ecosystem is one which
constitutes the environment for several systems (the
diverse organisms that live together there). Their ecol-
ogy is defined by the variety and number of organisms
present, and by the relationships established between
them.
These relationships can be competitive or coopera-
tive, depending on the particular «strategy» that each
organism has developed to survive and to give hope of
life to its descendents.
The organisms present in an ecosystem are actual-
ly, to use Gregory Bateson's terms, «auto-maximaliz-
ing entities». This means entities with a stimulus to-
ward their expansive reproduction (or, better yet, of
the «programme» that characterizes them) and that
consequently, given an absence of limits, would tend
to grow in number following an exponential progres-
sion (BATESON, 1972).
If this does not happen, it is because the limits of
the ecosystem, the availability of energy, for example,
act as «control variables» and block the growth of or-
ganisms at a certain point of their exponential curve.
There is balance in the ecosystem, then, when the
system-environment interaction (and, consequently,
the system-environment interaction between compet-
ing organisms) leads to a stopping of the growth of all
the auto-maximalizing entities present in it. On the
contrary, there is an imbalance when any of the con-
trol variables is lacking, and each system «slides» on
its growth curve till the ecosystem stops in a new bal-
ance position.
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Ecologized thinking
The observation of nature as ecosystem (one of the ec-
osystems placed in the biosphere) has led to focus on
its characteristics, to transform them into systematic
properties with general values, and, successively, to
verify their applicability in the most diverse fields:
from semiotics to material culture. To speak of ecology
while discussing the relationships operating in these
diverse fields (that could be defined in their totality as
the «artificial») means to express, in a synthetic form,
the change of paradigm of which we have already spo-
ken. Quite especially, to see the artificial as an ecology
(the ecology of the artificial) means passing from
«mechanicist thinking» (in which the conceptualiza-
tion of experience is produced adopting mainly me-
chanical models) to an «ecologized thinking» (in
which conceptualization is based on ecològic models)
(MORIN, 1990 : 78).
I am convinced that the ecologization of thinking
and the acknowledgement of an ecology that operates
with artificial entities, from ideas to products and so-
cial organizations, will constitute (and in part is al-
ready constituting) an important innovation in con-
temporary Western culture. This cultural innovation
will strongly influence the culture of design. The result
will be an «ecologized design», that is to say, a design
whose bases and reference points will have the new
cultural paradigm thoroughly interiorized.
The ecology of the artificial
What can be understood by «ecology» when the direct
reference to natural environments is lost, and it is con-
sidered as a formalization of the behaviour of complex
systems, be they natural or artificial?
Ecology, in its widest sense, appears as the study of
the interaction and the survival of ideas and pro-
grammes (that is to say, differences, complexes of dif-
ferences, etc.) in circuits (BATESON, 1972).
This definition of ecology is certainly very wide,
but it can also be rather hazy to those not familiar with
Bateson's terms. Here we will limit ourselves to remem-
ber that, for Bateson, the term «idea» coincides with
that of «difference» (BATESON, 1972 : 496). And that
«programme» is a group of ideas, that is to say, of dif-
ferences, that constitute the «unity of evolutionary sur-
vival», that is to say, the entities of which the system is
constituted.
To speak of the «ecology of the artificial» then,
leads us to read the contemporary environment as a
system of material and immaterial artefacts (which we
can call the «artefact system»), related and competing
between themselves in the interior of an ecosystem.
The possibility of applying the ecològic metaphor
to these entities and to the relationships established
between them arises from the fact that these appear as
«auto-maximizing entities» characterized, like biolog-
ic organisms, by an impulse toward extensive repro-
duction of themselves. But in what sense can artefacts
be seen as «auto-maximizing entities»? This question
can have two kinds of answers: a more immediate one,
and a more hidden (but not therefore less significant)
one.
The more immediate answer is the following: if we
speak of artefactes and their struggle for survival, we
really mean to refer synthetically to the socio-cultural
entities that produce them, and their struggle to sur-
vive.
The artefacts that we can consider are actually a
kind of «materialization» of cultural contexts, eco-
nomic interests, and the will to expression of design-
ers, businessmen, and productive sectors: it is these
entities that are really competing and that tend to an
extensive reproduction of themselves.
But, as has been said, the ecology of the artificial
can also be read in another, less evident, but more stim-
ulating way: the ecology of ideas and things from their
own capacity to become autonomous; in other words,
the ecology of ideas and things «left to themselves».
Ecology and autonomy of ideas and things
We can start from a question that I think many have
asked themselves: how is it possible that many of our
ideas, our actions, and the results from them often
seem to flee from the original intentions? How is it
that what is written often seems to escape from the
control of the writer? Why can a product, through the
years, assume meanings and functions different from
what the designer had in mind? Why do some forms
have a life in some way independent of the designers
who created them?
What we are testifying to with these questions is
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the existence of a sort of autonomy of all the realities
that are born and live in an environment: be they ideas
or be they products linked to these ideas (MORIN,
1977, BATESON, 1972, 1979).
Speaking of ideas, Morin writes that these are con-
figured
as relatively autonomous entities, that become auto-
mated, that live in the ecosystem constituted by human
culture and minds. This is the environment that nour-
ishes them, not only with energy, but also with organi-
zation. (MoRiN, 1990 : 87).
In other words, ideas have their own autonomy. Their
life develops in an ecosystem constituted by human
culture and minds. The life of a multiplicity of ideas,
their struggles, their clash, their mutual cooperation,
together constitute the ecology of ideas.
The same is true for those materialized ideas that
are the products, with their forms and functions. In
this case also, once they have been given an existence,
they assume a life of their own, they enter a system of
actions and interactions, between themselves and the
environment, till they assume, as we have noted, mean-
ings and uses that can be very far from those thought
of by the designer. This phenomenon can be seen as the
process by which the «product» (understood as an ar-
tefact strongly tied to the intentions of the designer
and the producer) becomes a «thing» (that is, an entity
with autonomy, and potentially open to the most di-
verses destinities).
Ecologized thinking (and ecologized design) is,
therefore, that which knows how to recognize the ecol-
ogy of things, and, consequently, their autonomy, this
capacity for departing from our intentions when mak-
ing the project, to evolve under the actions of ecosys-
tematic interactions, towards other meanings and oth-
er conditions of existence.
The ecology of the artificial
and the value of complexity
To look at the artificial as an ecosystem means to con-
sider the evolutionary plurality that has conformed it.
It means reading it as a polysystem constructed
through interaction, antagonism, cooperation, com-
plementarity, between multiple points of view, between
multiple rationalities.
This way of seeing things provides the designer
with lessons of two kinds: one relative to what should
be done, and another relative to thinking out his/her
own role.
The first lesson concerns the value of the complex-
ity of technological systems and indicates that we must
art to increase it, as far as design is concerned. Look-
ing at nature, we notice that an ecosystem is more
«fragile» as there is less genetic information found
there, that is to say, as less variety of organisms is
found there. By analogy, we can say that some techni-
cal systems or families of products based on a single
rationality and a single operative strategy (even though
it be very well studied and optimized) would behave
like a natural ecosystem composed of few varieties of
organisms (although very specialized): they would be
fragile systems, at risk of catastrophic fractures.
The ecològic reading of the artificial, coherent with
all we have obtained from the genealogical reading of
the artificial, thus leads us to value the complexity of
technical systems, that is to say, to promote the co-
presence of solution imposed following diverse logic
and diverse forms of rationality. The articulation of
energetic systems, productive systems, market systems,
and autonòmic systems, of the cultures in which con-
sumption and the enjoyment of goods and services is
produced, make up, in fact, the «genetic richness» of
the artificial ecosystem, the guarantee of its capacity to
evolve continuously in spite of the changes that can
take place in a wider context.
Ecology of the artificial
and individual responsibility
The reading of the artificial as a product of interac-
tion, that is, of antagonism, cooperation, and comple-
mentarity between a multiplicity of diverse entities,
helps to redefine the designer's role. If the production
of the artificial is a complex phenomenon, the subjects
can play a part there that is significant but in no way
decisive. In other words: each subjectivity has impor-
tance (and, therefore, a responsibility), but no subjec-
tivity is in a situation to dominate the whole system.
This combination between design (that is to say,
subjective intentionality) and systematic relationships
(that is to say, supra-subjective laws) is the way of con-
fronting the production of the artificial, escaping from
the paralyzing pincers that create the idea of the artifi-
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cial that inasmuch as it is a human product, can be
conceived of as a unitary design (with te consequent
power mania of the designer-demiurge, who designs
and produces on the basis of a unique rationality, the
whole of the environment, from a simple tea-spoon to
an entire city), and that of the artificial produced au-
tonomously, according to laws which have anothing to
do with our choices (the weak designer, who submits
to the rules of the system in which he/she operates, be
they what they may, or who, on the contrary, retires to
marginal spaces of minority criticism).
Each artefact, each image, each idea, has in itself
something of the rationality, values, and emotion of
whoever has designed, produced, or thought it. But
each of them is part of a wider and more complex dy-
namic system: a system with balances and imbalances,
and therefore, with a final quality which depends on
the conflicts and power relationships which are gener-
ated between the subsystems and the constituent parts,
stuggling to guarantee their own existence within the
established limits.
Limits as opportunity
The conscience of the existence of limits is another im-
portant aspect that characterizes an ecological reading
of the artificial.
From a culture thought up within the dynamics of
lineal and continuous development, we must today go
to a culture capable of thinking of itself and of the pos-
sibility of changing in the presence of established limits.
By now we have become conscious of some physi-
cal limits (resources, energy, territory), even though
that does not mean we have put into practice the in-
struments of operative praxis adequate to this new
consciousness. But the concept of limits is also emerg-
ing in other fields of production and consumption,
both material and immaterial: from the market limits
of industrial societies (with evidence of their satura-
tion) to the limits of the semiosphere (with the emer-
gence of the theme of the limits to semiòtic pollution)
(VoLLi, 1988). It could not be otherwise: the idea of
limits is coherent with that of ecosystem. The ecològic
reading of reality, that is to say, the extension of the
applications of ecològic models to the most diverse in-
vestigative fields, can only evidence in each of them
those limits that are a constitutive aspect of the model
itself.
But once the co-extensive nature of the terms «ecol-
ogy» and «limit» have been evidenced, we must be
more precise in understanding the limit in the frame-
work of an ecològic vision of reality. In this vision, the
concept of limit actually loses the negative connotation
of «impediment» which it usually has (the impediment
to arrive at a determined result), and it becomes linked
to tie and to opportunity. Actually, in the new episte-
mològic framework, «the law, as an expression of the
tie, defines, under certain conditions, the limits of the
possible. But it does not simply limit possibilities... the
tie is also opportunity» (CERUTI, 1986 : 17). The limit,
therefore, as Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers have
observed,
does not impose itself from the outside to a pre-exist-
ent reality, but rather participates in the construction
of a new integrated structure, and determines for the
occasion a specter of intelligible and new consequences
(PRIGOGINE, STENGERS, 1981b : 1076).
In the ecology of the artificial, the limit thus be-
comes a signal which indicates in which direction the
camp of the possible ends. In this definition we under-
line the fact that the limits do not mark the depletion
of the field of possibility: it only marks the end of the
field of possibility in that direction. Which means there
can be many more directions to take. What is more, as
can easily be certified in the history of society, but also
in the subjective experience of designers, it has often
been precisely the appearance of a limit that has gener-
ated and can generate the necessary impulse to search
in other directions and explore new opportunities. The
discovery of limits is absolutely not, therefore, the end
of history. Eventually, it could be a new beginning.
It has been said that designers must interiorize the
concept of limit in order to operate in the perspective
of a sustainable society. That is very true. The idea of
limits that must be interiorized must be that which we
have now tried to sketch, that is to say, the one derived
from the observation of nature as we have now learned
to look at it. If this happens, the interiorization of lim-
its (physical and semiòtic) can undoubtedly light up
new und unthought-of possibilities.
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